- Kato Hidetoshi's Data Base -
A Cultural Balance Sheet of Big Media
Publication Date:199203
Book title: MEDIA, CULTURE, AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN [A COLLECTION OF PAPERS]
Publisher : National Institute of Multimedia Education
Japan today is one of the media-saturated (or perhaps over-saturated) countries of the world. Every Japanese household subscribes to at least two newspapers a day, one in the morning and another in evening. Nearly 100 percent of Japanese families have at least one television set--most are color. There are six or seven TV station in each major city, broadcasting about 20 hours a day apiece. The diffusion of radio is even more extreme. Not only does each household have a radio, but also each individual, including the young children. There are some 30,000 kinds of magazines, published either weekly or monthly. In 1976, 15,000 new book titles were published and the total number of books sold reached 300 million copies, which means that each Japanese individual purchased approximately three books during that year. Advertisers are very active in the whole area of mass media,and they spend an equivalent of US $500 million each year to sell their commodities and services.
People are really absorbed by media. A series of surveys conducted by broadcasters and research corporations revealed that an average Japanese spent three hours every day watching television. The most enthusiastic viewers were found to be women, who spent some five hours watching television. As for newspapers, it was discovered that on the average, a Japanese spent about 30 minutes each day reading them. Radio is essentially for the youth, and one can find many young people between the ages of 10 and 18, listening to radio most of the time, even while studying. Indeed, they are the children of the age of media; often they cannot get along without some media, especially radio. They carry small transistor radios wherever they go. Even when they go to the mountains and forests for hiking, they prefer listening to a disc-jockey rather than to the sounds of the birds and the streams. As a critic once printed out, for the young people, nature has to be accompanied by music because they are used to seeing nature with music in the movies and on television. "Silent nature" is a somewhat alien experience for them.
Millions of white collar workers who commute between suburban communities and a central urban business district are absorbed by weekly magazines while they are on the train. In spite of the incredible crowding, they somehow manage to read the magazines. A researcher found that 30 percent of the older people, over age 60, thought that television was indispensable for their lives because, for them, television was the only joy left for them. At the peak viewing hour on Saturday evening during the summer, when television broadcasts professional baseball, the electric power companies reported a critical draw on their electric supply as people turned on their TV as well as their air-conditioners.
Once a popular song is introduced to the public through radio and television, the manufacturer of the disc may see more than a million records flowing into the market. When new cosmetics, hair-style, or fashions are advertised in junior magazines, thousands of teenagers would look for these products in department stores. At supermarkets, small children often pick up candy-bars or toothpaste they have seen on TV commercials. There are only a few examples that suggest the relationship between the media and the people in Japan today. People live with media, and media provides all information for the people. For better or worse, the life style of contemporary Japanese people is shaped by the various media, and the people cannot escape from it. These observations are not peculiar to Japan. Many countries of the world today share the same experiences and same problems. As a matter of fact, such areas of concern as the impact of television on the lives of children are becoming common topics not only among developed countries but also among the countries in their developing stage.
However, on closer examination, one will find that Japanese mass media have one characteristic that no other country shares, that is, the Japanese media are dominated overwhelmingly by "big media."
In the newspaper business, what are known as the "big three" (the Asahi, the Yomiuri, and the Mainichi) are the dominating papers. Each paper has a circulation of some seven million copies a day; in view of the fact that there are approximately 20 million households in Japan, we can infer that the entire Japanese population is reached by one of the "big three." Each of the "big three" has several thousand employees and at least four headquarters in the nation, one in Tokyo and others in Osaka, Fukuoka, and Sapporo. The archipelago of Japan is very small (much smaller than the state of California) but the island stretch from north to south for 3,000 kilometers; these four headquarters are set up to cover the four major sections of the country.
Newspaper anywhere have to face the problem of distribution. Until recently, the train was the major method of transportation; thanks to the well-developed railway system of the nation, the Japanese press did not have much difficulty in sending papers that were printed in Tokyo to other parts of Japan, although in some areas, delivery took more than 24 hours. The readers of these areas were thus left one day behind the news. With the arrival of regular jet service, the "big three" immediately began sending papier-mache molds of the day's paper to each headquarter so that the actual printing could be done locally. The local production of the paper "jet lagged" several hours behind the master printing in Tokyo, but this method was much more efficient than transporting the print run by train.
Further technological innovations were introduced. In the early 1960s, facsimile devices enabled a paper to be produced simultaneously in four headquarters. By this method, a key-puncher in Tokyo's central office types up a copy (involving a few thousand Chinese characters), and the copy is transmitted electronically to Osaka and other headquarters. There is practically no time lag between the Tokyo and Hokkaido editions, and the people of Japan are able to get the same news at the same time.
Prior to the introduction of jet freight, when the only means of delivery was trains, there was a chance for the small local newspapers to compete with the Tokyo-based "big three." As a matter of fact, the local newspapers has good access to news agencies, so many people preferred the papers to a Tokyo paper that came a day late. There are, of course, more than 3,000 local papers in Japan; after the arrival of the electronic age, when the "big three" began nation-wide operations, these local newspapers suffered from aggressive competition from the "big three." In many cases, the small local papers lost the battle; in some cases, when a local paper had had a solid tie with communities, the "big three" could not build a profitable market. But, generally speaking, local papers today are not so popular as they used to be. As a matter of fact, the "big three" have been extremely aggressive in their marketing into the area where local papers had established a solid market previously. The big national papers put tremendous amounts of money into promotion, giving one month's free trial delivery, free gifts for new subscribers, etc. In the Japanese language, this "newspaper war" became known as Nabe Kama Senso (the war of sauce pans and rice cookers) because the major national papers gave away sauce pans, rice cookers, and many small household items in their sales promotions. The "war" was not only between local papers the big national papers, but also among the "big three." If one of the "big three" gave a rice cooker, another challenged with the gift of a blanket. Consequently, the big national paper reached even the small mountain communities of remote prefectures. The most recent "newspaper war" was fought in the Nagoya area where a well-established local paper,the Chunichi, had enjoyed an almost monopolistic market since the nineteenth century. In 1976, the Yomiuri, after careful preparation, started a severe attack against the Chunichi by offering lower subscription fees, free gifts, and so forth. The case was brought to the attention of the Fair Trade Commission and is still under investigation. But even during in the past year, the Yomiuri has been quite successful in the Nagoya market, and in terms of circulation, the paper became the leader of the "big three" followed by the Asahi with a difference of some 100,000 copies a day.
The broadcasting business in Japan also is big business. NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai), a public broadcasting system, probably is the world's largest broadcasting network--three radio channels (two AMs and one FM) and two television channels. The organization is supported, through special regulations approved by the Parliament, by the subscription fees from listeners and viewers. By law, every Japanese household equipped with radio and television is obliged to pay a subscription fee of US$5.00 per month. Though there is no penalty for not paying the subscription fee, Japanese citizens are extremely cooperative with NHK and more than 95 percent of the households are paying their fee regularly. Since there are about 20 million families in Japan, the total gross revenue of NHK is an estimated US$190 million every month. With that money, NHK operates more than 500 stations all over Japan, with tens of thousands of full-time employees. Naturally, the huge revenue from subscriptions is being used for the production of better programs both in radio and television. Because it is public broadcasting, there is no commercial, and the law states that NHK must make its best effort to provide service to the nation. Therefore, NHK has built many small satellite stations in mountainous areas so that every household can enjoy good reception. The programming of NHK is modest and decent, but yet, its rating is high. Indeed, the most popular TV program of NHK, a four-hour music program broadcast on the evening of December 31st every year, sometimes reaches 60 percent of the possible audience.
Commercial stations have undergone the process of organization and reorganization, and at present, four major networks are almost completed. There is network coverage from Hokkaido to Okinawa, in other words, from the northernmost to the southernmost point of Japan.
Interestingly enough, until the 1960s, local stations used to be more autonomous than they are today. they produced their own programs even though they were affiliated with major stations of Tokyo or Osaka. It used to be quite common for a local station to produce and broadcast its own programs several hours a day, while buying programs from its affiliated key stations for the rest of the broadcasting time. But local stations found it more profitable to reduce the local production, because the major stations could provide good programs (at least in terms of their rating) sponsored by firms that had nation-wide market. Local stations, of course, have their own local sponsors (mostly spot commercials) but, thanks to an automated transmission system, they do not have much difficulty in inserting some local commercials at intervals in the programs they get from the key stations.
As a result, most of the local commercial stations came to prefer to be totally dependent upon the programs they get from the Tokyo-based stations. The studios that had been built for local productions often became warehouses or bowling alleys. The only productions besides spot commercials are the news programs broadcast several times a day for five minutes.
The domination of "big media" in Japan is in contrast to the situation of other media-saturated societies, such as the United States, where local media, especially local print media, still serve each community. As a matter of fact, in the United States, even the ideas of a "national" newspaper seems to be alien. In other words, the Japanese term "big media" is another name for highly centralized media with great power, while American media are more or less decentralized. And, as is obvious from what has been discussed, the "big media" have become more and more centralized in recent years with the advance of electronic technologies. No other people in the world are exposed so overwhelmingly to a media of national scale that bring nationally uniform information.
The source of the concentration and centralization of media in Japan are historical. In the first place, it should be noted that the government, either directly or indirectly, encouraged the emergence of "big media." This was especially true with broadcasting. Historically, when idea of radio was first introduced to Japan in 1923, the Japanese business circle was keenly interested in it as a new "business" in its strict sense. Of course, nobody could foresee how profitable radio could be, but many progressive businessmen of the time thought that commercial radio might bring a new horizon in business. Therefore, license applications for commercial broadcasting were submitted to the government one after another, and at one point, it almost seemed that broadcasting would begin as commercial radio. At the last moment the government decided to organize a special non-profit corporation as the heart of broadcasting in Japan. The first license was given to the corporation established in Tokyo on 1925, and then to similar corporations in Osaka and other major cities. After two years of licensing individual stations, the government suggested that the stations merge so that a single body could efficiently handle broadcasting throughout Japan. This was the beginning of NHK. Moveover, NHK thus organized came under the direct control of the government.
This was the time of international tension, and the Japanese military was ready to make its move into China. A highly centralized and government-controlled radio network was vital in this time of emergency and for the authoritarian government. It was during the war period that the diffusion of radio receivers was completed. The government transmitted many urgent messages and propaganda to the public, and the public vitally needed access to the news. Indeed, at the time when the American air force bombed major parts of Japan almost every day, the people had to be alert to the air-raid warnings at all times. Thus, the government encouraged the production and distribution of radio sets. In a word, Japanese radio began as a means of propaganda and emergency information.
The centralization of the newspapers had another historical development. As early as the 1850s, there was a move toward the publication of newspapers, and after the Meiji Revolution (1868), the dissemination of information through newspaper was very much encouraged by the government. Indeed, many policy measures were effected in order to give the people access to newspapers. Local governments were instructed to subsidize "good" newspapers, meaning the progovernment press, or even to let somebody start the business. Usually, each city had a "newspaper reading stand," a small hut where people could read the newspapers free. As a result, the newspaper business in Japan grew very quickly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hundreds of papers appeared. Those that were too critical of government policies were suppressed, and those that favored the government were encouraged. Like the press of nineteenth century America and elsewhere, Japanese newspapers were also quite partisan during that period.
In the course of history, the Japanese press learned two things. First of all, they leaned that the major, if not the only, information originated in Tokyo. Since the Meiji government was trying to centralize its power in every respect, the flow of communication was heavily Tokyo-centered. Very often the communication pattern of the Meiji period was one-way. The central government in Tokyo made the decisions, and orders and instructions were transmitted to each local prefecture where local governors administered these decisions. The press, mostly local at the beginning, found that the news from Tokyo was the most necessary news to the readers. At the same time, they had to face the fact that to obtain news from Tokyo was very costly. In the 1890s, the telegraph was the only way to get news from Tokyo, but the cost was great. In order to compensate for the high cost of telegrams, the management of local papers had to try to sell more copies. It is interesting to note here that two of the "big three." the Asahi and Mainichi, were not Tokyo-based papers. They were local papers of Osaka, the second largest city in Japan, and these two papers grew into big papers because they had to sell more copies to cover telegram costs! In contrast, Tokyo papers of the nineteenth century were satisfied with what they were (10,000 copies a day) because they had such easy access to the major information source--the central government. It has been an irony that the "handicapped" papers of Osaka because "big media" because of their handicap, and then moved to Tokyo in the 1920s.
The second lesson the press of the nineteenth century learned was the principle of neutrality--a non-partisan approach to current affairs. Neutrality was, according to their experience, the safest way to survive under the dictatorship of the Meiji government. They also discovered that the readers, generally speaking, were more supportive of a non-partisan press. By the turn of the century, the partisan press had almost disappeared in Japan, and the circulation of "neutral" papers grew. This neutral stance, also discovered by local papers (notably by the Asahi and Mainichi), helped them to grow. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the government encouraged the merger of newspapers, partly because of a shortage of paper and printing facilities and party because the government wanted more controlled news reporting. Many local papers had to merge. Thus, the emergence of "big media" in modern Japan is largely, if not totally, the result of governmental communication policy.
"Big media" after 1945 grew much faster than ever before. There have been more communication needs in the changing world in the past 30 years, and for the first time in modern history, Japanese were given freedom of speech and expression as a Constitutional right. Not only the mass media but also the communication industries prospered, especially after 1960, when post-war economic reconstruction was nearly completed.
By that time, "big media" were well prepared to expand their business.
In the first place, when the first commercial radio broadcasting was licensed in 1948, newspapers showed great enthusiasm for this new business. Without a single exception, newspapers in Japan, not only the big national papers but also major local papers, submitted their license application to the Ministry of Communication. In their applications, they cited good justification for being the first licenses--they though that in terms of news gathering and reporting they were the only qualified, experienced applicants. Since their approach was so aggressive and persuasive, the Ministry finally gave a license to the newspapers. Other applicants, such as the local business circle, decided to merge with the newspaper-dominated commercial stations. The news reporting on the radio was, needless to say, quite different from that of the newspaper, but newspapers were able to provide their affiliated radio stations with news to be broadcast. There are two or three commercial radio stations in Japan today that do not have any affiliation with the newspaper business; by subscribing to news agencies they have had no difficulty in news gathering and reporting. By the late 1940s, newspapers had an advantage in the broadcasting business. When commercial television began in 1953, again the newspaper business took the initiative in organizing new television stations. The Yomiuri, which failed to obtain a license for a radio station, was most aggressive (almost militant), in launching a new commercial television station, which is known as Nippon TV, completed its experimental broadcast with NHK. The Asahi and the Mainichi were put in a rather awkward position because there was only one channel available for them. These two papers had already made a joint radio venture in establishing Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), and they decided to continue their joint venture in television also. In the spring of 1976, after more than ten years of strange partnership, the situation was finally resolved; both the Asahi and the Mainichi got their own affiliated television station in Tokyo.
In Osaka, the newspaper-broadcasting combination took place more easily. The Asahi founded Asahi Broadcasting Co. (both radio and television), the Mainichi created Mainichi Broadcasting System (both radio and television), and the Yomiuri established Yomiuri Television. The important point is this: the "big three" in the newspaper business in Japan are also big in their affiliated broadcasting businesses. Since a similar affiliation and combination were in progress in Tokyo, it was natural for them to combine their respective broadcasting station with Tokyo. Thus the "big three" became huge information conglomerates.
Often criticism is raised regarding the monopolistic character of these conglomerates, but the management of each group would say that the newspaper and its affiliated broadcasting station are independent and autonomous corporations. As a matter of fact, very recently, a letter to the editor of the Asahi expressed openly the doubt about that paper's relationship with its affiliated station. The editor responded warmly and said that the paper and the broadcasting station were cooperating with each other, but both companies were independent and might have different policies. In fact, though the two companies are legally independent of each other, the top people of these affiliated station are usually those who have worked for the "mother-newspaper"; it is not unusual to se as a news commentator of a TV station, a retired columnist of the paper to which that particular station is affiliated. Indeed, they are cooperating each other. An affiliated station airs " house ads" for its "mother-newspaper" more than ten times a day, and in return, the TV page of the paper highlights programs of the affiliated TV station.
"Information conglomerates" in Japan are very active in other media industries. For instance, the publication department of each newspaper publishes a weekly magazine with a circulation of at least a half million copies. They also publish several kinds of monthly magazines and print more than 100 titles of books every year. A conglomerate is a self-contained "information kingdom," so to speak.
Moreover, they are interested in expanding into other service sectors of the economy. Asahi Broadcasting Co., of Osaka has built a magnificent hotel adjacent to the main office building of the company. The Yomiuri has become famous as the owner of a professional baseball team, Yomiuri Giants, which has been at the top of the national league. Of course, the Yomiuri conglomerate is in full support of the team, and the popularity of the team, in return, makes the Yomiuri more famous. The affiliated TV station, for the obvious reason, monopolizes the live broadcast of the baseball games whenever and wherever the Giants play. If the balance sheet of a newspaper company or a broadcasting company is looked at individually, the scale of its management may look modest. But if the gross revenue of the affiliated companies are totaled, the figure would be tremendous. A conglomerate has its press division, radio division, publication division, TV division, baseball division, hotel division, and even real estate division. No one can estimate the total capital assets of such conglomerate.
Since an information conglomerate is so huge, its financing is another interesting aspect to be examined. Though details have been disclosed, each information conglomerate has its main financing bank. In order to maintain neutrality, newspapers usually do not sell their stock on the market.
Instead, shares are distributed only among "insiders," namely, management and employee. But the capital thus formed is usually not sufficient to run the gigantic newspaper organization with its hundreds of bureaus, its sophisticated machines, and vast communication system. Therefore, they need financiers from outside. Major Japanese banks have been helping the newspapers by offering long term loans, good interest rates, etc. Moreover, since banks are also financing other media-related industries--paper mills, manufacturers of printing machine, electronics products--the hotel scale of their assistance to the newspaper business may amount to a fantastic figure. As business experts have pointed out in their research papers, the activities of banks in Japan are so broad that through banks, advertisers may be acquainted with media, too. In this fashion, as critics often point out, a media conglomerate may be interwoven into a larger conglomerate centered around a huge banking operation. In this sense an "information conglomerate" may mean more than the words narrowly interpreted.
Though people criticize "big media" for the many obvious defects and dangers, there are advantages in "big media."
In the first place, it should be again emphasized that "big media" played a significant role in nation-building of japan in the nineteenth century. The Meiji government was vary conscious of the media and did not hesitate to use government appropriations to promote newspaper business. The officials of that day though that the nation-wide diffusion of information from the government was vital for national integration. This was especially true with japan in the middle of the nineteenth century when she was trying to catch up with the West in a very short time. In retrospect it may be said that the government of Japan in the latter half of the century was the government of transportation and communication. A huge amount of the government's budget, which came from a centralized internal revenue system, was invested in the construction of railroads. As early as 1872, four years after the Revolution of Meiji, railroads connecting Tokyo and Yokohama (neighboring port-town) was completed and regular service was begun; in 1889, the whole Tokaido Line, a construction of some 500 kilometers linking Tokyo and Kobe, was completed. Between 1868 to 1890, numerous local railways were constructed; thus, after 1890, the major cities of Japan were connected by railroads.
The importation of the telegraph came very early, too. In 1869, as soon as the new administration came to power, telegraph cable was installed between Tokyo and Yokohama, and in 1872, communication by means of telegraph became available between Tokyo and Kyoto. Further, the first underwater cable successfully connected Hokkaido, the northernmost island, with the main island of Japan. It is no wonder that the government could take quick action against a military riot in the southern part of Japan in 1877. The riot, headed by Takamori Saigo, an eminent military leader of the day could have been a drastic coup d'etat if the central government had not been informed of the incident. As soon as the central military headquarters received the telegram, hundreds of thousands soldiers were dispatched immediately to the riot area, by railroad and by ship. The retaliation was so swift that the subversive group, which was on its way to Tokyo, was intercepted only 200 kilometers from the point of departure. The coup failed because the new government was equipped with the most sophisticated means of transportation and communication. A historian has remarked that the overwhelming victory of the central government vis-a-vis General Saigo's coup was a victory of communication. Moreover, because of wider dissemination of newspapers throughout the country, there was very little social panic during the unrest. The government could assure the public, through newspapers, that there would not be anything to worry about. The newspapers functioned as a tranquilizer for public, which otherwise could have been an additional disturbance for a government no yet solid and stable.
One may argue that a centralized communication system, combined with the centralized power of the government, should have been a terrifying experience for the people. It is easy, naturally, to label the Meiji government as an absolutist government. But at the same time, if there had been no centralized transportation and communication systems under the direct control of the new government, it is doubtful if Japan could have launched her rapid modernization. It may be too idealistic to apply a contemporary concept of freedom to a particular phase of history. Indeed, even in the United States, newspapers of the nineteenth century were extremely partisan, and top executives favored papers that supported his policies. (Though not well known publicly, the title and function of local postmasters of the United States was given, until 1904, only to merchants who supported the President, and therefore they changed as the administration changed.) Control over communication was probably a necessary stage for modern nation-building.
"Big media," historically, has had a tremendously integrative function, and Japan is a good illustration. In order to permeate the nation with a central political power, the Japanese government encouraged the people to read newspapers. A special postal rate for newspapers was established as early as 1872. Many prefectures distributed a copy of newspaper to each rural community where the priest of the local temple or a school teacher read the paper aloud for the villagers. It might be quite true that the contents of the papers thus distributed were partisan and very biased, but somehow, the government was successful in disseminating information throughout the country and in establishing an "informed public" of its own kind.
On the contemporary scene, too, the existence of "big media" brings many advantages. One of the characteristics of Japanese " big media" today is the fact that, because of their scale, they can afford to have many information sources of their own. For example, the "big three" newspapers as well as NHK, have hundreds of local bureaus and numerous branch offices abroad. News from Paris is covered by a group of permanent staff writers stationed there; news may come from Jakarta where at least one correspondent is permanently dispatched. Name any city in Japan with a population of more than 50,000 and there will be a correspondent for each media there, ready to phone the headquarters office if anything happens. As a matter of fact, it often seems that "big media" today are the world's most elaborate rather systems--hundreds of men and women all over the globe watching and reporting minute by minute that, couple with modern communication technology, gives an average Japanese citizen excellent access to the reports from both domestic and international sources.
Furthermore, because of having tens of millions of viewers, listeners, and readers, "big media" cannot afford to be irresponsible. A minor mistake in a news report may create millions of "mis-informed public," and therefore, the "big media" are extremely careful about the quality of news content. In a word, their bigness itself has became a strong backstop to keeping "big media" more or less honest and candid in their news reporting as well as in editing. They are a part of the "public domain," and they have to be always aware of their public role.
If we use newspaper reporting in the United States as a standard of comparison, for instance, the articles and stories that appear in the Japanese papers often seem to be too modest and even timid in their approach. Though modesty does not necessarily mean objectivity, "big media," by nature, must make their best effort to avoid any subjective statements in the press. As a matter of fact, if a paper makes a biased interpretation of an issue, the editors must be prepared to handle hundreds of letters of protest from the readers next morning, and this is the worst thing the editors of "big media" can anticipate. As a result, on a controversial issue, editors are conscious of allowing the same amount of space for different options. as we noted earlier, for the Japanese "big media," neutrality is of primary importance; this principle is not only well established within the media but also widespread among the readers as well.
The neutrality and modesty of the "big media" have created great public trust. When the size of media was relatively small and contents of such media were, to a certain extent, biased because of their affiliation with political parties, the readers did not have much trust in the contents. The readers used to hold certain reservations on what was reported and make their own judgments and interpretations. But with the rise of nationwide "bid media," people tended to be exposed to them without much cautious attitude, because they came to believe in the neutral position of the media.
There was another socio-psychological factor that reinforced the belief oh the public in "big media." Quite simply, people are tempted to believe in whatever is reported by "big media" simply because they know that millions of other also share the information. When seven million fellow readers are reading the same article, or when ten million other viewers are watching the same program, how can a single individual be skeptical about what the media present? The fact that millions of people share the same information is itself sufficient to make the public very confident about "big media,"
In a public opinion survey conducted recently, in answer to the question "What would you do when earthquake hits?" Eighty-five percent of the Japanese stated that they would turn on their transistor radio and listen to the newscast and instructions from NHK. They were sure that NHK's newscast would be fast and accurate and that NHK was one of very few reliable information source in case of emergency. It may be safe to say that NHK, as well as other "big media" in Japan, is trusted, appreciated, and thought to be very authoritative by the majority of Japanese people. As will be discussed later, this kinds of trust may be dangerous, bunt at the same time, to have a trusted media is a good thing in many respects.
In the case of broadcasting, the advantages of "big media" is tremendous. As defined st the outset, "big media" means big capital, and big capital means that the media can afford substantial production costs. The amount of money invested in program production, of course, does not guarantee the quality of the program, but usually, given a group of talented people, a station can produce a better program, either educational or entertainment, if the budget is generous. Without sufficient production cost, one cannot expect good programs. NHK and major networks affiliated with the "big three" information conglomerates, have the budgets to finance big programs.
For instance, NHK has successfully produced a yearlong series of programs "Heritage for the Future," an ambitious multi-million dollar project about archeological expeditions to various parts of the world. The series was well accepted by the general public (the program was on the regular broadcasting channel rather than the educational channel); it also won international recognition. Educational broadcasting in Japan, which probably is the most advanced both in terms of quality and quantity in the world, was made possible because NHK big enough to have put huge amounts of money into the development of educational broadcasting since 1932.
If media business were essentially small and local, their operation would also have been limited in scale. It is doubtful if a newspaper with a circulation of 30.000 could provide extensive global news reports. "Big media," because of their large-scale operation, can make the public aware of international affairs and open new perspectives for the common people, who otherwise might remain fundamentally provincial. "Big media," in this context, probably were the agents that diffused and accelerated more cosmopolitan viewpoints. Bigness in media operation implies many good things and advantages not only for media themselves but also for the national interest and for the people at large.
Though there are many good things about "big media," there are also many bad things about them. Some of the points discussed in the preceding section can be seem as bad things at the same time.
It is true that because of the emergence of "big media," Japan was able to accomplish her national integration. However, hindsight may also reveal that the integration, which was done so hastily, was achieved at the sacrifice of small autonomous local communities. The priority for the people of Japan in the last one hundred years has been to think about the national interest rather than the local interest. A notorious tax system, which was adopted in 1872, was designed to increase the budget of the central government, and prefectural governors were appointed by the central government. The money flow was almost entirely in one direction, that is, all tax money went to Tokyo; each prefectural governor received the budget for prefecture as a "rebate" so to speak. The power of central government was strengthened while local autonomy was in danger. In terms of the function of media, the news content tended to be the trends of the central government and relatively little attention was paid to local news; local governors favored the news from Tokyo since their responsibility was to keep the people informed about policies of the central government. Until the revolution of 1868, Japan was under a feudal regime; by definition, feudalistic social structure is essentially decentralized. Local societies were relatively independent of each other; feudal loads, who had their own autonomous governments and policies, ruled, with only loose control imposed upon them by the Shogun.
A local society had its own unique-culture, developed for centuries, and the people were very proud of their heritage, including their dialect. The diffusion of Tokyo-based "big media" almost completely destroyed the local dialects, especially after the introduction of broadcasting media. Indeed, media mediated language habits and the Tokyo dialect became "standard" simply because Tokyo was the dominant power. Conscious efforts to adapt were made in the schools, too. The children were taught "standard" Japanese--Tokyo dialect--instead of leaning their own local vocabularies and idioms. As a result, local dialects, many of which had delicate and intricate expressions, faded away. What made the situation even worse was that local people began, to feel inferior to Tokyo and the people of Tokyo, especially those within the central government, felt themselves to be culturally more advanced. According to linguistic studies, what is now known as "standard" Japanese is actually a strange combination of a kyushu dialect and the ancient court language of Kyoto, and this combination was invented in the 1870s. It is not even Tokyo dialect. As a matter of fact, those artisans and merchants of downtown Tokyo who have preserved the authentic Tokyo dialect are still indignant about the "standard" Japanese.
The power of the big broadcasting media was so overwhelming that "standard" Japanese because at least a "common" language for whole population of japan. A critic once commented that what is known today as "standard" Japanese is nothing but a peculiar language invented by NHK and proposed labeling "standard" language as "NHK language," NHK, which started business in the late 1920s, may be the Noah Webster of Japan--at least in the sphere of broadcast language--with less research and consideration than Webster.
This conflict of "standard" language and local dialects is still visible in contemporary broadcasting programs. Either on television or on the radio, without exception, those who speak local dialects are the comical figures and the other characters as well as the audience laughs at them. As a matter of fact, many young people with local backgrounds suffer because of their local accents when they go to get a job in Tokyo or the other major cities where the use of "standard" language is expected. They feel inferior about their language skills, and in extreme cases, some have committed suicide.
It should be noted that "big media" have been, more or less, destructive to local economy. Take for example the brewing industry. Brewing of sake and soy sauce have been traditionally local business; both products were heavy liquids that could not be easily transported. And for centuries, local brewers worked to give a unique taste and flavor to their own products. The market for each brewer was limited, but most of the brewers established a good reputation in each prefecture. The rise of "big media," especially commercial broadcasting, changed the market structure totally; a few large brewers spent millions of dollars to advertise their brands to the entire nation. Thanks to the modern transportation system, these manufacturers did not have difficulty in supplying millions of gallons of sake or sauce from their factories to any part of the country. The consumers, for obvious reasons, were tempted to by the nationally advertised products rather than local products they had brought before the age of commercials. The switching of brands meant the decline of local brewers; some brewers surrendered to the advertisement and marking activities of name-brand manufacturers and decided to be franchised by the "invaders." The local brewers today are still in business. They often seem to be more prosperous than before. But their factories are producing either sake or soy sauce that meet the specifications of name-brand brewers. The products are shipped in barrels to the central warehouse of the large brewer with whom the local brewers are affiliated, and at the warehouse, the liquid is bottled with the label of the big brand and sent to various parts of the country. One might thus see an ironical scene where the bottled and labeled products are shipped to a small town where the contents had originally been produced several days earlier.
Coupled with the diffusion of "standard" language and of name-brand merchandise, local communities in Japan are apt to lose their confidence in their socio-cultural autonomy. Until two decades age, the busy streets of local cities were called by the names that had persisted for centuries, but these days, the streets are referred to as "the Ginza." Ginza is the name of the busy shopping street in Tokyo, and the implication of the change of the name of the streets is that the local streets are trying to be mini-Ginza. In a word, local communities are trying to follow Tokyo standards in their city planning and life style in general. Very often, the "Tokyo-nization" of local communities bring some strange and ironical effects. For example, for the young people in Tokyo, TV programs with an urban setting are perceived as unreal since the viewers known the reality of the city through their own experience. Therefore, the teenagers of Tokyo are capable of checking the fantasies brought by television against reality. However, the youth of the small local communities do not have any means to check the contents of the programs and they tend to believe that what is depicted on television is real and true. As a result, for instance, the clothes they were, the cosmetics they use, the manner they assume, are often straight and direct imitations of what are advertised through television, magazine, and other "big media." Unfortunately, these teenagers do not have any means through which they can mediate what they saw on TV screen. A tragic happened in northern part of Japan when a certain number of people ordered prefabricated house as advertised through "big media." The construction materials were shipped, and the construction was completed. But the merchandise was designed and tested in Tokyo where there is practically no snow fall. The consumers who bought the prefabricated house in the snow country had to find out, through their winter experience, that the house was not study enough for heavy snow. Their ancestors, through centuries experience and wisdom, designed a house which could persist for at least 200 years in the snow country. The contemporaries, who made the wrong choice of an urban prefabricated house over traditional construction of the area, have had bitter experience.
Generally speaking, the penetration of "big media" has made the people less concerned about the communities in which they live. The headlines of the front page are always about international affairs or parliamentary debate, and most of the articles and stories are also Tokyo-based or Tokyo-oriented. A reader in a small town in a local prefecture is well informed about what is going on Washington, D.C., about how Arab nations are reacting to the UN, but he is not well informed about the budget of his community or days of the week when the garbage collector comes to his neighborhood. Even Tokyo residents often find it difficult to know what is happening in their neighborhoods. It is a good thing that the "big media" always keep the public informed about the international situation and parliamentary issues, but it is apparently defect of "big media" that they are not able to inform the public about important happening in the local communities. A Japanese proverb is frequently quoted in criticizing "big media" in this context--"the doorstep of the lighthouse is dark." Because of their world-wide orientation, it may be hard for "big media" even to provide a small flashlight to help people take a closer look at their doorsteps.
Since "big media" is big, the size of audience is big. In order to keep the audience satisfied, " big media" have to suffer from a serious problem in looking for "greatest happiness of the greatest number." There are so many various in the audience that this task seems to be almost impossible. An editor of one of the "big three" said that since there are 200,000 readers who are interested in chess he could not stop the daily column on chess, and since there are another 200,000 people who are fond of poetry, the poetry section could not be cancelled. And after listing hundreds of such examples, he concluded that a big newspaper had to be a hodge-podge of information. furthermore, "big media," by definition cannot take a partisan view; therefore, the information has to be mediated through several screening and checking process. A report cannot present a "sharp" viewpoint however justifiable that viewpoint is. In a mathematical metaphor, "big media" have to find the greatest common divisor. Often the solution is very dull. A "little" media is better able to take a less restrained view and can concentrate on particular issues and neglect chess and poetry. Small media are like small motorboats with the flexibility to run around. "Big media," in contrast, are like the 200,000 ton super tankers that cannot maneuver in small spaces.
Perhaps the worst thing about "big media," however, is the fact that there cannot be any medium through which the "big media" can be effectively criticized. Newspapers might be a good medium for criticism of broadcasting. Weekly magazines could be the medium for the criticism of newspapers. But as noted in the preceding section, "big media" are conglomerates. How can a newspaper criticize the TV programs produced by another member of "the family"? Media without criticism are dangerous, not only for the public but also for the media themselves.
A sociocultural balance sheet of "big media" is very difficult to calculate. Without "big media," national integration might have been impossible, but on the other hand, they were unable, by definition, to serve the local communities."Big media" can afford to have hundreds of bureaus all over the world, but at the same time, in order to keep neutrality, they cannot make sharp comments. "Big media" helped national advertisers to sell their products, which they made it difficult for small local industries to survive. "Big media" contribute to conveying the new urban life style, but on the other hand, the values and traditions of each local community, preserved for centuries, were altered. An item listed in the credit column is always counter-balanced by an item in the debit column. Whether the balance is in the black or in the red is extremely difficult to determine. It seems, however, that the balance should be viewed in the historical context. When a society is in the stage of nation-building, or when it is in a critical period, such as war, it may need more centralized "big media" rather than the aggregate of decentralized, small local media. For Japan of the nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century, probably the balance was constantly in the black, although black figures were made possible only at the sacrifice of many people and many values.
It is hard to make a judgment on the contemporary "big media" since most "big media" in Japan today have grown into huge information conglomerates and their operations are often monopolistic. As a matter of fact, it has been a common practice for the "big three" newspapers to issue announcement of subscription rate increases on the same day, with the same. Though they insist that their simultaneous announcements are "coincidental," many people are skeptical because such a beautiful coincidence cannot happen without hidden negotiations among the media. Such negotiation, if it really did occur, would have been in violation of the Anti-Trust Law, but there are no public agents who can question the "coincidental" hike in subscription fees. Usually, the "big media" represent the public in casting doubts about oil. steel, electronics, and other major industries that might be conspiring to fix prices and so forth, and usually the "big media" are indignant about "big industry." But on the topic of a possible conspiracy of the "big media" themselves, they are quiet. Such concentration of "information power" in contemporary Japan seems to be a dangerous sign in spite of the goodwill of the "big media" themselves and public support given to them.
It is important and interesting to speculate on the future of "big media," though forecasting is a difficult task. First of all, it should be noted that "big media" grew steadily until the early 1970s when the competition between them reached the saturation point. In the field of newspapers, since practically all Japanese households subscribe to at least one, the total circulation cannot continue to increase. A household may switch from one paper to another, but it is very unlikely that a family would bey another kind of newspaper in addition to what it has already. As a matter of fact, until the late 1960s, while the economy was growing, there was trend among middle-class families to subscribe to more than two papers. The oil crisis of 1973, however, stopped further growth in many sectors of economy. Many of those who had two papers decided to cancel one. There is no room for further growth of newspaper business. The most symbolic recent event is that, because of financial difficulties, the Mainichi, one of the "big three" was almost bankrupt as of June 1977. The others are also having difficulty. The Asahi stated a new adult education school, mainly to disperse its work force. The school, known as Asahi Culture Center, has been successful since its inauguration in 1972. The curriculum is advertised through the paper, and they have now about 10,000 students enrolled. But the mere fact that the Asahi had to start a new side business at this time means that the newspaper business today is not an easy one.
On the part of the public, there have also been many changes. In the first place, with the rise of citizens' participatory movements everywhere, people became aware of importance of the communities in which they live. Instead of talking about a great "world revolution," the young people began to take a closer look at the community and the neighborhood and to undertake small but meaningful and realistic innovations there. These people, for obvious reason, started small, non-profit (often at their own expense) community papers, which they labeled as "mini media." The number of subscribers are, by definition, very few, but the readers are loyal. The news these "mini media" carry are trivial if seen from the viewpoint of global or domestic politics, but important for community life. "Mini media," by their nature, cannot compete with the "big media," but many people are aware of the complementary nature of "mini media" to mass media, especially to "big media."
"Mini media" are popular not only on citizens' movements, but also in many other areas of life. Local governments, both prefectural and community, are keenly interested in publishing their own "mini papers" to inform the public of the policy, budget, and services of the local governments. For example, labor unions may have their own "mini paper," and a group of people who share Haiku as a hobby may publish a "mini paper." In this fashion, there are hundreds and thousands of "mini media" in Japan today and their number is increasing. In spite of the fact that typesetting the Japanese language is very complicated with its three thousand Chinese characters, a simple typewriter has been designed, and with that typewriter and a duplicating machine, anybody can produce a "mini media."
Technological innovation in electronics have also made for some interesting developments. Originally, radio and televisions were designed to be the receivers of regular broadcasts, but the combination of cassette tape recorders with radio, and more recently, of video-cassette with television, has given the audience an active part in programming. For instance, youth today are enthusiastic about "editing" their own tapes by mixing sounds from many different program sources, AM and FM radio, records, live sound, etc. A group of students once "produced" a song and had it taped. The tape was duplicated over and over again among the students, and eventually a radio station put it on the air. The students who "produced" the song did not have any intention of commercializing their work. It was simply the product of their hobby. After the radio station began playing it, the song became a hit. In other words, with modern electronics, the public, and especially young people, are now able to use mass media rather than to be manipulated by them, Because the youth can mix their own music, the radio stations may lose them as a steady audience.
Though it is still in its early stage, video-cassettes are changing the structure of viewing audience also. At present, a video-cassette deck sells for about US$500 and cannot be called inexpensive, but since the fall of 1976, some 150,000 sets are sold every month. In the future, the number of homes with video-cassettes will reach one million. An interesting change is taking place among those families who own the machine. Instead of watching regular TV programs, they tape the programs and "edit" them, For instance, a serial drama, which is broadcast 15 minutes every day, can be spliced as a two-hour, full-length program. A movie on television can be edited as a movie without commercials. NHK's educational programs can also be recorded. After collecting 10 or 20 shows in their "video-library," people tend to play the tape rather than watch the regular programs. Before the introduction of video-cassettes, people watched whatever was available. But with this new device, people can watch the program they want to see, at any time. Moreover, they can "produce" their own program with a video-camera, which can be attached to a video-cassette.
"Big media" were so successful mainly they were the "senders." The audience had to read, listen, and watch the information they provided. People did not have an alternative. But tape recorders and other recording duplicating machines have made the people much freer to choose information. "Big media" has to face a tiny, but strong opponent in these small domestic, even personal, communication machines. As many sociological surveys have shown, people, communication machines. As many sociological surveys have shown, people are more influenced by communication with close friends than by the mass media. The mutual exchange of information through the personal media--telephone, tapes, and even video--may have considerable effect on people. At least, these effects will be competitive with those derived from mass media. With these new developments, the "big media" of Japan today seem to have come to a crossroad. On the one hand, "big media" will continue to grow bigger and bigger, but on the other hand, "big media" of the future cannot be they have been, The public today has access to diverse information sources and it knows how to use them.
Kato Hidetoshi's Data Base
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