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The Birth of A "Free Radio"
--Broadcasting Under Military Occupation--Publication Date:199203
Book title: MEDIA, CULTURE, AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN [A COLLECTION OF PAPERS]
Publisher : National Institute of Multimedia Education
Japan has always been very responsive to new developments abroad. And in the technological fields, she has been particularly watchful of the American scene. The field of radio broadcasting has been no exception. Immediately after the successful start of radio broadcasting in Pittsburgh in 1920, Japanese businessmen as well as technicians became keenly interested in the broadcasting business, and as early as 1922, several experimental radio broadcasts were conducted. Many people, especially newspaper people, were looking forward to the possibilities of radio broadcasting as a new business, and in 1923, some 55 applications for broadcasting licenses were submitted to the Japanese government. Takeshi Inukai, at that time Minister of Communication, investigated the applications carefully and decided to suggest that the applicants merge and form new bodies in three major cities in Japan, i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. The three stations thus founded started operation in 1925, and they were legally independent public corporations financed by private capital.
However, in the spring of 1926, the government ordered the three stations to consolidate into a single system called "Japan Broadcasting Corporation" (Nihon H_s_ Kyokai), and nominated former officials of the Ministry of Communication as the directors of the new corporation. In spite of strong resistance on the part of the broadcasters, government power at last forced them to consolidate, and they completed the network system in 1928. Needless to say, this was the beginning of NHK, or the public broadcasting system of Japan. It is safe to say that NHK is extremely peculiar in the sense that it has been under direct government control but still financed by private capital. And NHK had to became a "government agent" during the war for obvious reasons. The private investors who founded NHK had disliked the increasing government pressure on their stations, and it was natural for them to see the end of the war as a great opportunity to establish "free radio."
In September 1945, only few a days after the formal surrender of Japan to the Allies, Mr. Jinkichi Terada (the son of Jinyomo Terada, who tried to establish the first radio station in Osaka in early 20's) inaugurated a "preparatory office for the new broadcasting company." By the end of the same year, Mr. Terada and the editorial staff of the Mainichi newspaper had merged to establish a new station called "New Japan Broadcasting Company Limited." Their application for a license was submitted to the Ministry of Communication.
In addition to this new company, several other groups were interested in the broadcasting business. In Nagoya, Mr. Tsunejiro Miwa, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the city, initiated "Ch_bu Nihon Broadcasting Company Limited," and in Tokyo, Mr. Chu Funata, the chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, took the initiative in inaugurating the "People's Broadcasting Company Limited."
Government officials were also looking into the possibilities of new broadcasting system, since part of NHK's facilities had been confiscated by the Occupation Forces, and General Headquarters (GHQ) was said to have a radical plan for reorganizing Japanese mass media. Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae, the Minister of Transportation and Communication, foresaw the reform of NHK and the communication industry, and began to encourage the establishment of a new broadcasting system based on private capital. His idea was to make this new broadcasting system complement NHK, and the proposal was approved in a cabinet meeting in September 1945.
The proposal then was sent to GHQ for examination and was accepted favorably at that moment. However, for months, GHQ did not respond to the prospectus and every time that Dr. Matsumae and his staff visited the officers of GHQ, they were told that the matter was "pending" or "under consideration." Indeed, GHQ officers did not have much time for or interest in the new broadcasting system, since they were more concerned with the reform of NHK.
On 11th of December 1945, GHQ released a memorandum on the "Reorganization of NHK" which suggested (1) abolition of Government control over the NHK organization; (2) the establishment of a new, autonomous public broadcasting system; and (3) the appointment of a new committee, representing the people of Japan, which would select the chairman of NHK and advise him. In addition to the memorandum, the officer of GHQ made the oral comment that they were not considering permitting any private broadcasting, since democratization of NHK would be sufficient to respond to the new needs of the public. The committee suggested by the memorandum was organized. At that time, the idealism of New Deal prevailed at GHQ, which preferred to have more or less progressive (left wing) people in the committee. Conservative candidates recommended by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication were rejected by GHQ. In a word, GHQ's policy was to make a revolutionary change in the organization and management of NHK, bringing in the most radical elements.
The committee nominated Mr. Iwasaburo Takano as the chairman of NHK and made a series of recommendations for the reorganization of NHK. GHQ's orders and advice for NHK programs were two-pronged. In the first place, they instructed NHK to produce such anti-militaristic programs as "This was the truth," "The people who defended freedom," and "School for the people." And at the same time, they tried to bring in the American programming pattern--15 minute time-modules, entertainment such as quiz and participation programs--which had not been known to Japanese broadcasting.
Mr. Matsumae, the minister who initiated and encouraged the move toward new free broadcasting systems, found himself in an awkward position under the reform policy of GHQ in which the reorganization of NHK took priority over a new radio system, and he had to recommend that applicants for broadcasting licenses petition directly to GHQ, since he had no authority as the coordinator between applicants and GHQ. The applicants had a difficult time with GHQ, which had ultimate power over broadcasting.
GHQ's reluctance to give broadcasting licenses was somewhat understandable from the viewpoint of occupation policy. On December 11th of 1946, GHQ asked the Joint Occupation Committee (consisting of delegates from China, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A.) for their decision on the broadcasting system of Japan under occupation. The British representative said that, for the purpose of checking on and controlling broadcasting programs, a single system (NHK) was desirable at that stage. China was of the opinion that the Australian model (having both public and commercial stations) was the ideal. The Soviet Union, after a month-long study, came to the conclusion that the concentration into a single system would be advantageous for occupation policy and opposed the idea of commercial broadcasting on the basis of possible commercial manipulation by capitalists. In short, the resolution of the committee was to maintain the Status quo in Japanese broadcasting and not to permit any new broadcasting system. They fundamentally agreed to maintain NHK, under the control of GHQ, as the only system. The Ministry of Transportation and Communication, in effect, was advised by GHQ to confirm the cancellation of all applications for broadcasting licenses and to report that decision and action to the cabinet meeting. All of the applications were rejected and applicants were informed that their applications would be "kept on file."
The decision of the Joint Committee and GHQ was, needless to say, catastrophic to the people who had been working for independent stations. In most of the preparatory offices in the broadcasting field, the initial capital was almost exhausted and investors lost interest. Moreover, on the 4th of February, 1947, GHQ purged the central figures among the applicants, such as Mr. Terada and Mr. Funada, on the basis of their business activities during the war. Most of the offices, therefore, were disbanded, and the shareholders lost their money totally. As Mr. Terada remarked on the occasion of the final dismissal meeting of shareholders, "the hope of yesterday has been replaced by the disappointment of today."
In the midst of this despair, there were continuing efforts on the part of a small number of people who did not give up. For instance, Mr. Hideo Yoshida of the Dentsu Advertising Agency organized a research team to discuss the problems of commercial radio broadcasting under free competition, preparing for the day when commercial stations would be permitted. Mr. Daikichiro Tagawa, a Christian pacifist who advocated free radio, wrote a memorandum to General MacArthur in which he said "The broadcasting institutions of a society are vital to the culture of the society. What you promised us at the beginning of your occupation was freedom of speech, but I am afraid that the concentration of broadcasting into a single public broadcasting system is contradictory to what you promised. I heard that the Allies already have permitted free radio in Italy. I do not think the Japanese people are inferior to Italians" (retranslated from Japanese text in the absence of the original).
The most important and effective continuing effort, however, could be found in a resolution of the Judicial Committee of the Japanese government, which had been working on the reformation and interpretation of Japan's legal system. One of the basic issues was the reform of laws which regulated communication. The Radio Act, which came in effect in 1914, stated in article 1 that "wireless means of communication shall be under the control of government" and that the minister may permit "private enterprise" only under special circumstances. NHK as a public corporation had been one of the exceptions where "special circumstances" were applicable. But the GHQ memorandum on the reorganization of NHK was, obviously, in conflict with the Radio Act, and furthermore, in Japan's new constitution "freedom of communication" was described as one of the fundamental civil rights. The committee had to establish new laws which could accommodate both the constitution and the memorandum, and while doing so, the committee came to the conclusion that the monopoly on broadcasting by NHK was not legally fair. Thus begun a legal dispute between GHQ and the Japanese government. Mr. Hiroshi Torii of the Ministry of Communication theorized that the monopoly of NHK might be necessary while Japan was under occupation, but in the post-occupation period, radio broadcasting based on free competition could be the only hope for Japan.
On October 16th, 1947, GHQ called a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Communication and gave its "final suggestion" in which the following four points were made clear.
1. The new broadcasting law should be based on
a. the freedom of speech
b. political neutrality
c. responsibility for public service, and
d. maintenance of technical standards.
2. An autonomous public agency responsible for checking all broadcasting should be established.
3. The agency should consist of
a. a licensing division and
b. its own broadcasting division to which NHK could be transferred.
4. Private commercial stations should be licensed.
The officials of GHQ added that they did not have any intention of encouraging monopoly in broadcasting, and that they would rather suggest strongly that commercial stations be licensed at the time when "economic conditions of Japan permit such ventures." In other words, GHQ wanted to see the coexistence of both public and commercial broadcasting in Japan.
This announcement flatly contradicted the memorandum issued less than a year before, stating that commercial broadcasting would never be approved. What factors affected this policy change? As discussed in the preceding pages, "resistance" by Japanese government and business was one of the factors; also, the conflict of occupation policy with the Japanese constitution put GHQ in a difficult position. But there seem to have been certain internal changes in GHQ. First of all, GHQ became more and more conscious of Japanese public opinion. Japanese newspapers were very active in discussing the problems of broadcasting, and the opinion trends were carefully translated and studied by GHQ. Secondly, GHQ came to have a more or less optimistic perspective of Japan's future after two years' occupation, and was becoming prepared for a "post-occupation" era. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, whose position had been against any private broadcasting enterprise, lost much of its influence in the joint occupation committee and this enabled United States to act more freely. In any event, the policy of GHQ changed sometime between December 1946 and October 1947, and the move toward "free radio" was reactivated.
The next step was to legislate a new "broadcasting law" in the Japanese parliament. The draft was prepared and submitted to the parliament in June 1948. The proposed law consisted of 106 articles, but consensus was not reached among GHQ, the Japanese government, and the other interest groups concerned. In particular, government officials, except for the few who drafted the law, were either disinterested in or ignorant about commercial broadcasting. Most of the people were simply unable to imagine broadcasting solely dependent on advertising. Even the Minister of Communication of the day(Mr. Matsumae had retired already) was not confident about the possibilities of commercial broadcasting in Japan. There were technical difficulties, too. Mr. Amishima of the Ministry of Communication reported to the communication subcommittee of the parliament that Japan did not have any extra radio wave channels, and that future prospects for them were poor. Furthermore, an officer of Ministry of Finance testified for the subcommittee that the ministry was not ready to encourage the banking business to help broadcasting, and he implied that those who wanted to start a broadcasting business had to be ready with their own money.
The detached attitude of both government and parliament was a mystery, but according to Mr. Amishima, who explained the mystery several years later, the government was instructed not to pass the law during the session but to postpone it until next year. Indeed, there is a very interesting passage in the June 30th records of the communication subcommittee, in which the chairman ordered the stenographer to keep off record for several minutes and then continued "...therefore, it will be quite difficult to reach any resolution before the end of the session; but I feel that this is a good opportunity to inform the public of some of the ideas the government has." In all of the government records during the occupation period, it was customary to have an "off-record" portion where the directives and suggestions from GHQ were reported. One can suspect, in this context, that GHQ was still reluctant to license commercial stations. It did not disapprove the idea of free radio. It even encouraged it. But there seemed to be the judgment that is was "too early" for commercial broadcasting in Japan.
In April 1949, GHQ suggested to the two key officials of the Ministry of Communication, namely Mr. Torii and Mr. Amishima, that they go to the United States for a month-long inspection tour of American broadcasting. This suggestion was very important in the sense that it made the possibility of commercial broadcasting seem more real and it also provided the opportunity for Japanese broadcasting to look to America for a model. And what these two officials learned was tremendous. Mr. Torii spent much of his time studying the FCC and licensing procedures, and Mr.Amishima, being an engineer,made an extensive survey of area coverage and frequency allocations. Above all, they were impressed by the development of American broadcasting stations and became quite confident of the success of similar stations in Japan.
Upon their return to Japan, Mr. Torii and Mr. Amishima worked to modify the "broadcasting law" which had been pending since 1948, and interestingly enough, this time GHQ was in support of the modified draft, which emphasized a "Broadcasting Committee" (an equivalent of the American FCC). In the new draft, articles concerning the "radio code" disappeared and commercial broadcasters were assured full freedom of speech. In a word, the new draft was much more liberal than the one which had been submitted in 1948. And this time, those who opposed the draft were the government and NHK rather than GHQ. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, the Prime Minister of the day, insisted that the chairman of the "Broadcasting Committee" had to be one of the ministers and that the Prime Minister had to have power over the committee. Because of his strong insistence, government activity on the law was stopped. Mr. Yoshida declared that unless there was a "directive" from GHQ, he would never approve the law. GHQ, instead of giving him a formal "directive," sent out a private letter from General MacArthur to Mr. Yoshida in which he was assured that lack of direct government control over broadcasting would cause no difficulty. Mr. Yoshida reluctantly surrendered, saying that he would interpret the "private letter" as a kind of "directive."
Immediately after Mr. Yoshida's bitter compromise, the draft was submitted to the parliament. Although there was opposition from both the communist and socialist parties, with slight modification the law finally passed both upper and lower houses in April 1950 and came into effect on the 1st of June of the same year. In Japan today, the 1st of June is celebrated as "Radio Day" (Denpa no hi). It took four years and eight months from the time Mr. Matsumae advocated the necessity of free radio until it materialized, and as described in the preceding pages, there were many ups and downs both in occupation policy and government reactions.
The business circle, which had lost both interest and money for broadcasting, recovered; and once again many applications for licenses were submitted. According to records, there were 11 applications as of September 1948, when the first draft was still pending, and the number increased after the beginning of 1949. The Ministry of Communication accepted another 11 applications before February 1949, another 9 before September of the same year, and by February 1950, there were 45 applications altogether. When the second draft was submitted to the parliament, the number of applications had reached 72. Among these 72, 42 met the standard qualifications for applicants, and in April 1951, 16 of them were licensed. The first Japanese commercial stations to start broadcasting were New Japan Broadcasting (NJB) of Osaka and Ch_bu Nihon Broadcasting Company(CBC) of Nagoya; almost simultaneously, they began their program broadcasting on the 1st of September, 1951. From the conception of "free radio" in Japan until its birth, five years had passed. The birth was not an easy one.
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